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Abstract: With the rapid development of ATIS, the effect of information provision on travellers’ route
choice behaviour has received much attention. In this paper, we develop a dynamical traffic system within
the frame of bounded rationality by an integration of the BNN dynamic and Cumulative Prospect Theory to
characterize travellers’ day-to-day route switching behaviours and investigate the process and conditions of
achieving UE under ATIS. Under three mild constraints, we prove that no matter what the initial state is and
whether travellers’ reference points are fixed or updated under certain rules, the dynamical system can
eventually evolve to UE, at which the link flow pattern is uniquely determined and globally asymptotical
stable, while uniqueness and asymptotic stability of the route flow pattern cannot be ensured, which call for a
further exploration of the network topology and link performance. Finally, we demonstrate the above
conclusions and illustrate the process of achieving UE through a numerical experiment.
Keywords: User equilibrium, dynamical system, Cumulative Prospect Theory, the BNN dynamic.

1 Introduction
The user equilibrium (UE) principle has become a cornerstone for traffic assignment modeling ever since it
was proposed by Wardrop [18], which implies that travelers have perfect information on traffic conditions
and are entirely rational in their decision-makings. However, this is not the case in reality. Due to the
uncertain nature of traffic conditions, it’s impossible for travelers to have full access to the information and
perform their travel decisions with entire rationality. UE is a method of equilibrium analysis, which
primarily focuses on the issue of equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It’s assumed that if equilibrium
exists, then it will be bound to occur. Actually, absolute equilibrium is always difficult to achieve, while
disequilibrium exists universally. Equilibrium and disequilibrium have achieved dialectical unity and can
complement each other.
The traffic system is always in the process of evolving toward equilibrium which is usually hard to reach.
Therefore, it’s also essential to carefully examine the process and conditions of achieving UE from a
disequilibrium state. Meanwhile, stability is an important performance in the sense that if equilibrium is
unsustainable, even a small perturbation will lead the system to evolve away from the current equilibrium.
Horowitz [8] demonstrated that even for a well-behaved system whose equilibrium solution was known to
exist, the system might fail to converge to equilibrium, the achievement of which still depending on
travelers’ route switching process. In other words, equilibrium emerges from the long-term outcome of
travelers’ learning and decision-making based on their past experiences, which underlies the day-to-day
traffic dynamics. The key question of traffic flow evolution modeling is how to characterize travelers’
leaning procedures and decision rules more accurately.
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Advanced traveler information system (ATIS) is generally believed to be efficient in improving
travelers’ trip planning, alleviating traffic congestion and enhancing network performance, etc. With the
rapid development of ATIS, how to describe the trajectory of traffic flow evolution and forecast the final
equilibrium state is becoming more and more important, which involves a further exploration of travelers’
learning and decision-making behavior within the frame of bounded rationality. So far, the application of
game theory in day-to-day traffic flow evolution modeling is still at a preliminary stage. Moreover, PT (or
CPT) is usually found to be incorporated in equilibrium analysis of stochastic traffic networks. The BNN
dynamic is a well-behaved evolutionary dynamic which can provide a plausible micro-foundation for
describing human learning process in repeated games with incomplete information [14].

In this paper, we attempt to formulate a novel dynamical traffic system model by an integration of CPT
and the BNN dynamic to characterize travelers’ day-to-day route choice behavior based on information
provided by ATIS. Under three mild constraints, we present a reasonable explanation to the process of
achieving UE by the establishment of equivalence between UE and equilibrium point of the dynamical
system, whose asymptotical stability is also analyzed.

2 UE based on CPT
2.1. Network representation and assumptions
Define G = (N, A) as a strongly connected traffic network with N and A being the sets of nodes and links
respectively. Let W be the set of origin-destination (OD) pairs of G and w be one of the OD pairs. Let Rw be
the set of routes between OD pair w, and R be the set of routes of G. Let a, b, etc., denote the links, and p,
q, etc., denote the routes. Let xa be the flow on link a, and x be the vector of link flows. Let f pw be the flow
on route p between OD pair w,
f 

f w 

, f pw ,



be the vector of route flows between OD pair w, and



be the vector of route flows of the network. Let dw denote the travel demand between OD

pair w. Let 

be the link-route incidence whose value is 1 if link a is on route p, and 0 otherwise. Let v wp

, f w,

w
a, p

denote the prospect value (PV) of route p between OD pair w, and v w be the route PV vector between OD
pair w, and v   , v w ,  be the route PV vector of the network. We assume that the traffic flow is
continuous and the links possess the effects of separation and crowding:
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According to flow conservation, there exist the following relations:
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If a route in the network is composed of many links, we can deduce that the travel time on the route
follows a normal distribution according to the Central Limit Theorem:
2
(5)
Tpw～N t pw ,  pw  , p  Rw





where

t

0
a

is the free flow travel time on link a, and ca is the capacity of link a.
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Figure 1 The test network

3 Conclusion
The UE Principle is a method of equilibrium analysis to describe a world with dust settled, while
evolutionary game theory provides a method of evolutionary analysis to describe how the dust settled. In
this paper, we establish a dynamical traffic system by an integration of CPT and the BNN dynamic to
investigate the process of traffic flow evolution and achieving UE under ATIS. It’s indicated that no matter
what the initial state is and whether travelers’ reference points are fixed or updated under certain rules, the
dynamical system can evolve to UE eventually, at which the link flow pattern is uniquely determined and
globally asymptotical stable, while uniqueness and asymptotic stability of the route flow pattern cannot be
ensured, which call for a further exploration of the network topology and link performance. We also
present a numerical experiment to validate our conclusions and illustrate the process of achieving UE from
diverse initial states and by different reference point update rules. Equilibration and evolution are reference
point dependent, implying that the traffic management authority can employ effective measures to
manipulate travelers’ reference points, so as to guide the traffic system evolution toward desirable
direction. In addition, several directions for further research should be identified. Firstly, some conclusions
need to be further verified with gradually relaxing the constraints in this paper. Secondly, parameter
estimation for the PV function and analysis on reference point update rules with experimental or field data
are required for real applications. Thirdly, seeking for more plausible evolutionary dynamics that conform
to travelers’ actual learning and decision-making behavior through empirical studies is also a research
target. Lastly and most important of all, applying the models to real traffic network is a still bigger
challenge in future.
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